“Say My Name”: The Politics of Not Naming by Samour, Nadija




first sight, the “ABC of the OPT” creates the impression that this is yet another
book written exclusively by Israeli academics about a situation that has profoundly
transformed the framework of occupation law—and international humanitarian law in
general—a long time ago.
This first impression is underpinned by the use of hegemonically loaded terminology,
structure, and choice of entries and sources.
Despite the many nuances academics employ to draw a picture of Israel’s
“complicated” rule over the Palestinian people, this review takes issue with the
hesitance displayed when looking for a much needed epistemological shift and
concepts in understanding how law creates injustice in Israel_Palestine. Perhaps
the lack of this shift is due to the authors’ usage of the lexicon format, which at times
demands fitting a proverbial square into a circle. Consequently, the table of entries
oscillates between headings that adopt the sanitized legal technicalities of the Israeli
occupation authorities (“assigned residency”, “security prisoners”) and others with
more vague meaning such as “kinship”, “quality of life”, or “lawfare”.
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At closer reading, one does find in this volume straight-forward analyses of Israeli
policies in Palestine. Thus, it is not yet another book written in the style of the
occupiers reflecting their own history and practice. It is, for example, invigorating
to read about the impact of Israeli pre-1967 policies that are crucial to uphold the
ongoing colonisation of Palestine (p. 305, under entry “O- Outside/Inside”). This
proves a historically conscious approach to understanding the situation beyond a
hegemonic, linear narration. By also shedding light on colonial practices of the British
Mandate era and its parallels and continuities, the book breaks with certain time
markers that have for far too long dominated and obfuscated the thinking and writing
about Palestine/Israel. This goes as well for the chapter exploring the concept of
settler-colonialism (p. 202 under entry “J-Jewish Settlements”). It would have been
interesting to read how this approach could be mirrored in legal terms. Reynolds and
Xavier, for instance, consider the “very structure of settler-colonialism in a context of
occupation“ criminalised under Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute.
Yet reading the book might leave you puzzled, because the most urgent task
remains unaddressed: to provide an adequate legal framework that moves beyond
international humanitarian law – and perhaps one that focuses on ending the
occupation.
The Need for Epistemological Shifts or: A for Apartheid
The lexicon is certainly an unconventional way of addressing legal knowledge.
But let’s recall that lexica are used to canonize knowledge that is deemed worthy,
preserving it for the future. This raises the question why this format has been chosen
to address a legal framework which no longer serves the situation on the ground.
In fact, the idea that a prolonged, indefinite occupation that seeks to permanently
change the social, political, and demographic reality of a foreign territory is illegal has
been argued by one of the authors elsewhere in the case of the occupied Palestinian
territory as well.
But while the “ABC of the OPT” can be lauded for providing detailed evidence
of the illegality of Israel’s prolonged foreign military occupation of Palestine, its
designed arbitrariness, and its unsustainability, the reader may wonder why the
authors hesitate to address a more forward-thinking framework. Credit must be
given for delivering an introduction to the mental lexicon of Israeli military thought
and practice, picked up by Israeli law-makers, the judiciary and in part endorsed
by Israeli legal scholarship (also known as the military-legal complex). The authors
successfully reflect how the law can be stretched to its utmost breaking point,
becoming the second skin of the occupation and steadily worsening the situation of
the occupied, rendering them stateless, landless, homeless. Yet an urgently needed
epistemological shift to assess the situation on the ground adequately is absent.
The very first entry of the book serves as an example of how the lexicon largely
remains within Israeli military-judicial thinking, with the editors employing
the first letter A for “assigned residency”. Military-legal thought and practice
are in themselves a worthwhile endeavour that deserve to be studied. But in
epistemological terms, I wonder why the suggested approach is incapable of
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integrating “apartheid” or “annexation” as legal terms and as epistemological
concepts of systematized characterization of what is going on in Palestine.
Apartheid is defined in article II of the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973):
The term “the crime of apartheid”, which shall include similar policies and practices
of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in southern Africa, shall apply
to… inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining
domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons
and systematically oppressing them.
Although the term apartheid was originally associated with the case of South Africa,
it now represents a species of crime against humanity under customary international
law and Art 7 (1) (j) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
according to which:
“The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts… committed in the context of an
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group
over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining
that regime.
Legal debates about the application of the legal concept of apartheid to the
situation in Palestine_Israel are ongoing. Such an analysis has been suggested and
extensively researched in the past. Numerous reports like those of the UN Human
Rights Council, the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, the Human Sciences
Research Council of South Africa, including studies of international legal, political,
comparative, biographical, and ethnographic aspects of apartheid in Palestine_Israel
have been published and have found their way into scholarly discourses. News
reports, commentators, NGO reports highlighting apartheid policies with regard
to access to water, freedom of movement, citizenship, reflect the need for a shift
towards grasping the discriminatory and oppressive shape the Israeli domination of
Palestine has assumed.
The idea that the occupation framework is obsolete is not new. Yet the lexicon
merely mentions apartheid as a legal concept when it comes to the arguments of
Palestinian petitioners before the High Court of Justice (Supreme Court of Israel).
For example, the Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense case in 2009 discusses
questions of expropriation and annexation of Palestinian land for Jews only. But
apartheid as a legal term is not mentioned. More precisely, the entry “Proportionality”
refers to President of the High Court of Justice Beinisch’s concurring opinion, which
rejects the comparison of Israel´s practices with apartheid because, according to
the judge, there is a “ great distance between the security measures practiced by
the state of Israel for the purpose of protection against terrorist attacks and the
reprehensible practices of Apartheid policy.” (p. 161).
The entry then concludes by saying that such rendering does “ignore and deny the
reality“, asserting that the “[court’s] discourse, however, is extracted from the broader
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context of opposition to occupation, annexation, and systematic discrimination”( p.
161).
But it seems that the entry does not confront the judge´s unwillingness to discuss
apartheid as a legal concept. Thereby, the entry denies this legal debate as
something worth mentioning and examining. The reader is left behind with the
impression that the authors hide behind the smokescreen of Israeli legal language.
Why would calling out apartheid be important, though?
Only when there is a word for a certain relation or a type of injustice we can start
to effectively incorporate it into our legal analysis. Think of the history of terms
such as sexual harassment, intersectionality (on naming “power and privilege”,
and rendering visible the centuries old oppression that links gender, race and
class) (Vivian M. May, “Intersectionality”, Rethinking Women’s and Gender Studies,
Chapter: Intersectionality, Publisher: Routledge (2012), Editors: Catherine Orr, Ann
Braithwaite, Diane Lichtenstein, pp.155-172, p. 156), genocide (“destruction of the
national pattern of the oppressed group and the imposition of the national pattern of
the oppressor”), or apartheid (legalized racial supremacy). In each instance in which
the “name” came into being, “the act of recognition was a momentous one”.
What we learn from the history of any of these legal concepts mentioned above is
that it wasn’t enough to paraphrase what is wrong; humanity needed a name for it,
not least because it instigates thinking about law’s inner workings. That the authors
often (not always) stopped short of doing so in the book under review here (whereas
they do so elsewhere) is even more surprising, since there was no need to create
new names terms already used by Palestinian and international scholarship could
have been employed. Thus, the main concern here is the use of hegemonically
military-loaded terminology, structure, and choice of entries and sources, which
conform to an obsolete legal discourse that is structurally unable to remedy the very
regime this hegemony sustains and reproduces.
This epistemological gap also has implications for the political discourse in
Europe, where paraphrasing apartheid, without naming it, is becoming increasingly
commonplace: since February 2017, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini
has repeatedly raised concern over “entrench[-ing] a one-state reality, with unequal
rights for the two peoples, perpetual occupation and conflict.” Similar language
has been recently adopted by other European countries such as France and
Germany, while European diplomats in the West Bank now refer to “systemic legal
discrimination”.
Granted, the notion is loaded because of its rightfully horrifying associations with
apartheid South Africa. Independent from that historical situation, however, it is
a legal term of art that is being discussed as part of the preliminary proceedings
brought by Palestine before the ICC in The Hague. But alas, the book does not
engage in this grand debate currently happening in The Hague.
By not addressing the apartheid question, the authors are silencing not only
Palestinian legal resistance to Israeli control over them but also growing academic
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scholarship about apartheid in Israel_Palestine, its potential, and its limits. This
approach is at odds with the promise the book offers at the outset, when Walter
Benjamin´s “tradition of the oppressed” is invoked in order to challenge dominant
legal frameworks. It might come across as counter-intuitive given the highly
asymmetrical situation on the ground, but it is Palestinians resisting Israeli policies
shape the law, too. Palestinians have pushed for statehood recognition and
membership of international legal and judicial bodies such as the ICC, have ratified
and used numerous international legal treaties, and have a long-standing tradition in
advocating for their rights in legal terms.
This again shows what goes missing when a narrative is used that simultaneously
identifies a structural injustice and refrains from articulating an operational discourse
towards its resolution. “And that has made all the difference.” (p. 161).
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